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Appellant Frank K. Gilroy, through his counsel of 
record, submits this Reply Brief in support of his appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
UTAH'S "CATCH-ALL" STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO PETITIONS FOR 
PATERNITY. 
Appellee argues, in a complete breakdown of logic, 
that the two specific statutes of limitations applicable to 
suits for support and education of a child should somehow 
result in no statute of limitations for an "action solely 
for paternity." (Appellee's brief, pg. 10). Appellee 
contends that this Court should not apply the four year 
"catch-all" statute of limitation (Utah Code Ann. §78-12-
25(3)), because "the legislature already provided its own, 
different types of limitation in the Paternity Act" and "if 
the Utah State Legislature intended to limit a petition 
based solely to establish paternity, certainly such a 
statute would be enacted." Id. However, Appellee not only 
ignores the clear language of section 78-12-25(3) by asking 
this Court to render application of the statute an 
impossibility, she has attempted to side step (1) the clear 
dicta and ruling in Szarak v. Sandoval. 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 
1981), (2) the long and extensive application of the "catch-
1 
all" statute of limitations in other cases by this Court, 
and (3) case law in other jurisdictions. 
A. Dicta in Utah Case Law Clearly Establishes that a 
Petition for Paternity is Subject to the Four Year 
Statute of Limitations. 
In the case of Szarak v. Sandoval, supra, Justice Oaks 
writing for a unanimous Court stated that it was unnecessary 
to rule on the issue of whether the "catch-all" statutes 
were considered by the Court in Nielson v. Hansen, 564 P.2d 
1113 (Utah 1977). Rather than deciding the issue of whether 
a paternity action is governed by the three year statute of 
limitations "for liability created by the statutes of this 
State" (section 78-12-26), or the four year statute for any 
"action for relief not otherwise provided by law" (section 
78-12-25(3)), Justice Oaks simply reasoned that section 78-
12-36 tolled the applicable statute of limitations "during 
the period of the child's minority." 636 P.2d at 1085. 
However, at no time did the Court even hint that no statute 
of limitation applies to paternity actions. Moreover, the 
Court's holding that .i I i3lling occurred during minority 
could only result if there was an underlying statute of 
limitation. Without a statute of limitations, there would 
be absolutely nothing to toll. Appellee's argument 
completely fails to address how the Court in Szarak v. 
Sandoval could toll a non-existent or non-applicable statute 
of limitations, as Appellee suggests. 
Throughout Justice Oaks' opinion, the Court referenced 
no fewer than 5 times the existence of a statute of 
limitations applicable to paternity actions1; yet, no 
reference was ever made by the Court that if the Utah State 
Legislature intended to limit a petition for paternity, it 
would have done so. Therefore, consistent with the dicta 
and tolling result of Szarak v. Sandoval, as well as the 
"public policy considerations" regarding support of minor 
children voiced in Nielson v. Hansen. 564 P.2d at 1114, this 
Court should reverse the Trial Court's denial of Appellant's 
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint because Appellee is an adult 
and over 20 years have passed since the four year statute 
ran and the commencement of her suit. 
1
 The five references are: (1) . . . "another statute 
precludes the application of any period of limitation 
against the plaintiffs in the circumstances of this case." 
636 P.2d at 1084; (2) " . . . § 78-12-36 would clearly 
prevent the statute of limitations from barring a paternity 
and child support action . . ." 63 6 P.2d at 1084; (3) "While 
the child's action to establish paternity and enforce child 
support is not barred by the statute of limitations until 
after the child attains majority . . ." 636 P.2d at 1084-
1085; (4) "Is the statute of limitations also tolled during 
the child's minority for a paternity and child support 
action . . . " 636 P.2d at 1085; and (5) "Consequently, we 
hold that any statute limiting the time within which a 
paternity action must be commenced under the Uniform Act on 
Paternity is tolled . . . " 636 P.2d 1085. 
3 
B. Utah Courts Have Consistently the Four Year 
Statute of Limitations Where No Specific Statute 
of Limitations Could be Found. 
Appellee has ignored the long line of Utah cases 
applying the four year "catch-all" statute where there was 
no specific statute of limitations. Olsen v. Hooley, 865 
P.2d 1345, 1347 fn.l (Utah 1993) ("intentional infliction of 
emotional distress ... is not subject to a specific 
statutory limitations period [and therefore] is governed by 
the residual four-year limitations period found in section 
78-12-25(3)"); Atwood v. Sturm, Rucrer's Co., 823 P.2d 1064 
(Utah 1992) (products liability claim against manufacturer 
for injury by pistol was subject to the general four-year 
statute of limitations); Stevensen v. Monson, 856 P.2d 355, 
1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (an action against a county is not 
subject to a 6 month statute of limitations but is subject 
to the four year catch all statute); Whatcott v. Whatcott, 
790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (psychological injury from 
alleged sexual abuse during childhood was subject to the 
general four-year statute of limitations); See also, Parker 
v. Weber County Irr. Dist., 251 P. 11 (Utah 1926), applying 
Comp. Laws Utah §6474 (1917), later codified as Utah Code 
Ann. §104-2-30 (1943), the predecessor "catch-all" statute 
of limitations to section 78-12-85(3), which read, "An 
action for relief not otherwise provided for must be 
4 
commenced within four years after the cause of action shall 
have accrued.11; Brantina v. Salt Lake City. 153 P. 995 (Utah 
1915); Fullerton v. Bailey, 53 P. 1020 (Utah 1898). 
Furthermore, in American Turret Corp. v. City of W. 
Jordan, 840 P.2d 757 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed the long history of applying the "catch-all" 
statute and reaffirmed that the catch all statute of 
limitations " to all actions, both legal and equitable, in 
which affirmative relief is sought." 840 P.2d at 760. The 
Court next concluded that before applying the "catch-all" 
statute it must first satisfy itself that "Utah's current 
statutes of limitation do not contain a more specific 
provision." Id. Finding no specific statute of limitation, 
the Court held that the four year "catch-all" statute . 
Therefore, this Court should follow the long line of 
cases applying section 78-12-25(3) and its predecessor to 
actions for relief where no specific statute of limitations 
applies. Because Appellee's claim for "affirmative relief" 
was filed more than 20 years after the four year statute had 
run, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's ruling and 
direct the Trial Court to dismiss Appellee's complaint with 
prejudice for failing to file timely her action. 
5 
C. Case Law in Other Jurisdictions Supports a Holding 
that Appellee's Paternity Action is Governed by 
the Catch-all Statute of Limitations. 
Courts which have addressed the issue of whether a 
general statute of limitations applies to an action to 
establish paternity where no specific statute of limitation 
existed generally involved children under the age of 
majority. See generally, 59 A.L.R. 3rd 685 (1974) "Statute 
of Limitations and Illegitimacy or Bastardly Proceedings". 
See also, Payne v. Prince George Dept. of Social Services, 
507 A.2d 641 (Md. App. 1986) (the three-year catch-all 
statute of limitation, but tolled the statute during the 
minority of the child); Ortega v. Portales. 307 P.2d 193, 
195 (Colo. 1957) (Court refused to apply three year statute 
of limitations during minority of child, finding that there 
was a "continuing liability" upon the father "until said 
child has attained the age of eighteen years."); State v. 
Steinbaugh, 138 N.E.2d 252 (Ohio 1939) (Court held that 
statute of limitations had no bearing and the Court had 
continuing jurisdiction at any time "while the child is 
still of an age that requires support."); Miller v. 
Townsend. 514 N.E.2D 325 (Ind. App. 1987) (tolled the 
statute during the minority of the child); Spada v. Pauley, 
385 N.W.2d 746 (Mich. App. 1984) (tolled the statute during 
the minority of the child). 
6 
However, in the case of Torres v. Cautino's Heirs, 185 
F.2d 788 (1st Cir. 1950), the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered a paternity action brought by an adult and upheld 
the dismissal of his claim for untimely filing. In that 
case the plaintiff, a 37 year old man, filed suit in the 
Federal Court for Puerto Rico seeking that he be declared 
and acknowledged as a legitimate son or acknowledged natural 
son of Genar Cautino-Insua. The plaintiff was born January 
10, 1909, and filed his suit on August 8, 1946. The 
District Court concluded that since there was no specific 
statute of limitations, the plaintiff's complaint was 
subject to a "catch-all" statute of limitation providing for 
a term of 15 years. The District Court further ruled that 
the 15 years statute was tolled during the age of minority 
of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the District Court ruled 
that because the 37 year old adult plaintiff had obtained 
majority on January 10, 193 0, the 15 year period expired on 
January 10, 1945, over a year before the action was 
commenced. This decision was ultimately affirmed by both 
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and the First Circuit. 
Therefore, this Court should follow the logic and 
holding of the First Circuit in Torres v. Cautino's Heirs. 
supra, and reverse Judge Iwasaki's denial of Appellant's 
7 
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